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In many developing countries, smallholder farmers cultivating vegetatively propagated crops (VPCs) 
have limited access to quality planting material. This constraint can limit both the yield of and returns on 
VPC cultivation. Yet policy and regulatory initiatives designed to strengthen access to quality VPC 
planting materials have been relatively unsuccessful to date. Part of the problem is the unique biological 
and economic characteristics of vegetative propagation and its distinctness from cereal crops, which 
dominate narratives on seed system reforms. Drawing on qualitative analysis of policy and practice, this 
study examines reform options related to quality assurance regulations in four crop-country combinations: 
cassava in Nigeria and Vietnam, and potato in Kenya and Vietnam. The study highlights theory and 
evidence on existing models of regulation; alternative models that may better incentivize cost-effective 
multiplication and distribution; and recommendations for policy, regulation, and investment in VPC seed 
markets. Findings indicate that regulations designed around strict and centralized quality control systems 
tend to limit market size, while more localized production systems are limited by both capacity and reach. 
These findings suggest the need for alternatives that balance a permissive regulatory regime with 
decentralized production systems, grassroots capacity development, market surveillance, and systems that 
integrate internal (producer-level) quality assurance with external (regulatory) quality assurance.  
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Vegetatively propagated crops (VPCs) play an important and varied role in many agricultural production 
systems and in people’s consumption choices throughout much of the developing world. An estimated 
300 million people living in poverty throughout the developing world depend on at least one type of root, 
tuber, and banana crop for their livelihoods, and this figure is expected to continue growing over time 
(Thiele et al. 2017). Despite their importance, there are significant variations in yields among root, tuber, 
and banana crops across developing countries, with per-hectare output well below what breeders and 
agronomists believe is biologically feasible under optimal agroclimatic conditions and crop management 
practices. Similarly, there is significant variation in the returns on cultivating these crops, whether for 
farmers’ own household consumption or for local, domestic, or export markets.  
One pathway to increasing VPC yields and returns is through the use of quality planting materials 
by farmers (Almekinders et al. 2019). These planting materials—generally referred to as “seed” 
throughout this paper—are cuttings, stems, buddings, tubers, or other vegetative material used to 
asexually propagate a plant that is genetically identical to its parent. Both market and nonmarket systems 
that supply seed to farmers are recognized as an integral part of efforts to boost VPC yields and returns 
and, more generally, to support agricultural development (Cromwell, Friis, and Turner 1992; Jaffee and 
Srivastava 1994; McGuire and Sperling 2016).1 Systems that deliver seed of both good genetic and 
physical quality are an essential complement to other yield-enhancing inputs and crop management 
practices.  
This study is motivated by the question of whether there are appropriate quality assurance models 
that can increase availability of and access to quality seed for VPCs cultivated by small-scale, resource-
 
1 To avoid confusion, note that we refer to “seed systems” throughout this paper as a generic phrase to describe any system in 
which planting material is produced, exchanged, and used. This system covers true biological seed as well as asexually, clonally, 
or vegetatively propagated materials. For the purposes of this paper, cassava “seed” refers specifically to propagation material 
derived from stems or stakes cut from a mature plant, while for potato, the term refers to seed tubers used for planting. 
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poor farmers while simultaneously minimizing the risk of spreading pests and diseases that might threaten 
their yields and incomes.2 
Most developing countries have explicit policies and regulations that govern seed systems and 
markets, and many have policies and regulations that aim to address this question in broad terms. During 
the past two decades, some governments have actively explored changes to these policies and regulations, 
driven largely by new technological opportunities; by growth and development concerns; or by the need 
to comply with international trade agreements, conventions, and treaties (Spielman 2020; Spielman and 
Kennedy 2016; Louwaars, de Boef, and Edeme 2013). But the phytosanitary, physiological, and physical 
qualities of VPC seed—irrespective of genetic improvement—rarely garner attention in the formulation 
and implementation of these policy and regulatory reform efforts.  
VPC seed systems have not featured prominently in these efforts partly because of the unique 
challenges associated with VPC seed and the limited attention they receive when compared with cereal 
seed systems in national strategies for agricultural development. Common characteristics of VPCs include 
low multiplication rates in seed production, bulkiness and perishability in storage and transport, and high 
susceptibility to pests and disease at all stages of seed production and use (Kapinga 2013; Gibson et al. 
2009; Fuglie et al. 2006). These characteristics tend to limit the temporal and spatial reach of VPC seed 
systems and markets, and thus have implications for seed accessibility and affordability for smallholder 
farmers. 
VPC seed systems also share certain commonalities with many cereal seed systems—
commonalities best framed in economic terms. First, VPC seeds are credence or experience goods: their 
genetic and physical quality cannot be observed by a farmer at the time of exchange, thereby making it 
difficult to assess their utility or value in use. These problematic exchanges can, in certain situations, 
imply asymmetries of information between seed seller and farmer that can crowd out sellers of higher-
 
2 Throughout this paper, we refer to “pests and diseases” as shorthand for seed- and soil-borne pests and diseases that are directly 
affected by VPC seed quality. Many other pests and diseases affect VPCs as a result of other biological phenomena, crop 
management practices, or other factors, but are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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quality seed and encourage the entry of sellers of lower-quality seed into the market, thereby reducing the 
efficiency gains expected from market exchanges (Akerlof 1970).3 In other situations, interventions 
designed to address asymmetric information still may not sufficiently resolve the basic demand-side 
challenges posed by credence goods in the marketplace.  
Second, VPC seeds embody gains from innovation—improvements integrated into the seed as a 
result of plant breeding or good quality assurance in seed production—that are difficult for the innovator 
to appropriate. A farmer who purchases VPC seed can, in the absence of a law or contract to the contrary, 
simply save a vegetative portion of the plant for use as seed in a subsequent season or time period. This 
fact implies the generally widespread availability of low-cost substitutes for purchased seed in the form of 
farmer-saved or informally exchanged seed, albeit of unknown quality with pest and disease loads that 
may be increasing over time.  
The extensive literature on seed market frictions in developing countries suggests that regulations 
related to quality assurance may be a remedy to the information problem (e.g., Pal and Tripp, 2002; Tripp 
and Rohrbach 2001; Morris 1998; Tripp and Louwaars 1997), while intellectual property rights may be a 
remedy to the appropriability problem (Spielman and Ma 2016; Eaton, Tripp, and Louwaars 2006; Lesser 
2000). Quality assurance regulations such as seed certification and truthful labeling laws can provide 
farmers with information on the source of the seed, production date, expected germination rate, genetic 
and physical purity, and other indicators that signal quality to farmers, drive low-quality producers from 
the market, and increase the efficiency gains of the market exchange. Quality assurance systems internal 
to a seed producer can provide similar outcomes (Gildemacher et al. 2017), provided that external 
monitoring (or the threat of external monitoring and consequences for regulatory noncompliance) inhibit 
rent-seeking behavior.  
 
3 The term “market” used in this context refers to any exchange of seed between two individuals, and may include cash- or credit-
based transactions between agents in a formal marketplace, or less formal barter or contract arrangements between neighbors or 
traders. The nature of the transaction should not affect the analytical results of the Akerlof (1970) “lemons market” when applied 
to seed exchanges in our context.  
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Relatedly, intellectual property rights reward the owner of the variety by implicitly assigning a 
claim over the productivity gains accruing from the seed’s use by a farmer. The literature on these 
remedies has focused primarily on cereal crops such as rice, wheat, and especially hybrid maize4 
(Naseem, Spielman, and Omamo 2010; Pal, Tripp, and Louwaars 2007; Koo, Nottenburg, and Pardey 
2004) but is relatively silent on VPCs, whose unique characteristics such as low multiplication rates, 
perishability, and pest and disease susceptibility are much more significant issues.  
VPC seed systems—like all seed systems—are a matter of political economy. Different actors 
construct competing framings, use different language, and create advocacy coalitions to advance their 
respective interests in policy change processes that influence seed system development (Hassena, Hospes, 
and De Jonge 2016; Scoones and Thompson 2011; Kloppenberg 1988, 2010). In other words, it is 
impossible to analyze seed system policy from a purely technical perspective or as an exercise in 
economic efficiency analysis without recognizing that future outcomes are also shaped by competing 
actors, interests, coalitions, and power dynamics.  
This study examines three research questions. First, what types of public policies and regulations 
govern quality assurance in VPC seed systems? Second, how do these policies and regulations influence 
access, availability, and quality of VPC seed for smallholders? Third, what alternative strategies might be 
employed to increase access, availability, and quality of VPC seed for smallholders?  
At the heart of this study is a question about which quality assurance systems effectively balance 
the need to increase access to and availability of quality VPC seed for smallholders while also minimizing 
the biotic threats that accompany low-quality seed production and use. Drawing on qualitative analysis of 
both policies and practices, this study examines specific policy options for developing countries by 
exploring quality assurance regulations for four crop-country combinations: cassava in Nigeria and 
Vietnam, and potato in Kenya and Vietnam. The study highlights both the theory and practice driving 
 
4 The productive and economic value of hybrid maize is conferred by heterosis, or the yield gains realized by crossing inbred 
parent lines. These gains are generally strongest in the first generation (F1) of hybrid seed and decline rapidly in subsequent 
generations, thus requiring farmers to purchase new F1 seed each season to continually realize these gains. Similar gains are not 
observed in self-pollinated crops such as rice and wheat, such that harvested grain can be saved for use as seed in a subsequent 
season without significant genetic depreciation, although physical depreciation may occur due to treatment and storage practices.  
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existing models of regulation; offers alternative models for VPC production, distribution, and marketing; 
and recommends several novel policy, regulation, and investment options in VPC seed markets.  
The study also makes a unique contribution to the literature on the policy dimensions of seed 
systems in developing countries by emphasizing quality assurance for a class of crops that are typically 
overlooked in the analysis, design, and implementation of seed regulation. The policy literature on seed 
systems has revolved almost exclusively around varietal improvement in cereals, neglecting both VPCs 
and the issue of phytosanitary, physiological, and physical quality (irrespective of genetic improvement) 
(see, e.g., Thiele et al. 2021; McEwan et al. 2015). In fact, we know of no scholarly work on regulatory 
frameworks for VPC seed systems in developing-country contexts beyond those prepared as part of this 
study.  
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CASE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES 
The crop-country combinations selected for this study were chosen to provide variation in terms of the 
crop’s use or uses in the economy (i.e., subsistence/consumption versus commercial/industrial); the nature 
of the crop’s seed systems in the selected country (i.e., formal and regulated versus informal and 
unregulated),5 and the research team’s own familiarity with these countries’ seed systems, markets, and 
policies. Necessarily, VPCs and VPC seed systems are heterogeneous across both crops and countries: 
significant differences exist in crop reproductive biology, the material used for planting, the commodity’s 
economic and cultural value, and the context in which it is cultivated, exchanged, processed, and 
consumed. The selection of cases here aims to capture several key dimensions of this heterogeneity while 
also highlighting commonalities, with the aim of developing a methodology that can be extended to the 
study of other VPC crop-country combinations and provide a basis for a more generalizable framing of 
the policy and regulatory issues and options for VPC seed systems. 
Potato in Kenya was chosen for its importance in the country’s agricultural development strategy, 
its widespread consumption, and the extent of the informal seed system, but also because of recent growth 
in a more commercial/industrial use of potato and a formal seed system. Cassava in Nigeria was chosen 
due to the crop’s central role in successive agricultural development strategies of the country, its 
widespread production and consumption, its role in value addition (i.e., processing into gari and chips 
that are then sold commercially for consumption purposes), and an almost universally informal seed 
system. In Vietnam, both crops were chosen to explore their different contexts. Potato is neither widely 
produced in large quantities nor consumed as a staple food, and is thus of marginal importance to the 
national development strategy. Yet it is increasingly important to Vietnam’s agroprocessing industries, 
the urban commercial food sector, and international trade, which, in turn, may lead to an increasingly 
 
5 Throughout this study, we refer to “informal” and “formal” seed systems as shorthand for the extent to which seed quality is 
regulated. But this characterization may also be pejorative in describing how farmers in “informal” systems save and exchange 
seed within their communities, and it suggests an unrealistically linear construction derived primarily from analysts’ experiences 
with maize seed sector development in industrialized countries (Coomes et al. 2015; Louwaars, de Boef, and Edeme 2013; de 
Boef et al. 2010; Almekinders and Louwaars 2002). A more appropriate term might describe informal seed systems as “socially 
managed” or “developmental” in nature (Spielman and Smale 2017).  
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formal seed system. Cassava is almost exclusively a feedstock to Vietnam’s starch industry, not widely 
consumed as a food staple, and reliant on an informal seed system (Le et al. 2019). The uniqueness of 
each crop-country combination is explored in greater detail below; for the complete country studies, see 
McEwan et al. (2021) on potato in Kenya, Gatto et al. (2020, 2021) on cassava and potato in Vietnam, 
and Wossen et al. (2020) on cassava in Nigeria. Table 1 and Table 2 provide figures on cassava and 
potato area harvested, yield, and production in this study’s focal countries and in key comparator 
countries.  
Table 1 Cassava area harvested, yield, and production, selected countries, 5-year average, 2014–
2018 
Country Area harvested (ha) Yield (mt/ha) Production (mt) 
Brazil 1,389,800 15 20,699,182 
Cambodia 418,420 26 11,435,482 
Colombia 218,395 10 2,159,869 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 4,063,311 8 33,068,762 
Ghana 953,492 19 18,532,775 
Nigeria* 6,464,931 9 58,472,749 
Thailand 1,377,028 23 31,211,734 
Vietnam* 547,103 19 10,394,865 
Source: FAO (2020).  
Note: * denotes focal country in this study. 
 
Table 2 Potato area harvested, yield, and production, selected countries, 5-year average, 2014–2018 
Country Area harvested (ha) Yield (mt/ha) Production (mt) 
China 4,833,840 18 86,088,602 
Kenya* 160,952 11 1,663,130 
Netherlands 158,447 43 6,741,581 
Peru 315,616 15 4,764,321 
United States 421,767 48 20,311,272 
Vietnam* 22,183 15 324,460 
Source: FAO (2020).  
Note: * denotes focal country in this study. 
 
Once crop-country combinations were chosen, data were collected from two distinct sources: (1) 
key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs), and (2) publicly available 
documents and data. KIIs and FGDs represent the primary data sources used in this study. Identification 
of participants for the KIIs and FGDs was guided by the multistakeholder framework for intervening in 
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root, tuber, and banana seed systems (RTB 2016). Participants included representatives of government 
ministries and agencies, regulatory bodies, and research institutes; private companies and industry 
associations; international research centers; donor agencies; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
farmers’ associations, and other civil society groups; and female and male farmers. Participants were 
interviewed in 2017 using semistructured interview guides that were developed for each category of actor 
(IFPRI et al. 2019). The interview guides include a range of topics, including basic details about the 
interviewee and his or her role in seed production or use, understanding of VPC quality assurance 
standards and practices, and viewpoint on the effectiveness of current policies and regulations and their 
differential impact on female and male seed producers and users. Where just one or two respondents were 
present, discussions were conducted as KIIs, and where a larger number of respondents were present, they 
were conducted at FGDs. The difference between KIIs and FGDs pertains primarily to how the discussion 
is managed and how information is presented, discussed, validated, refuted, and revised by participants 
and the interviewer, with a larger group (FGDs) often allowing for more iterative processes and a single 
respondent (KIIs) allowing for greater depth in the inquiry.  
Geographically, KIIs and FGDs were concentrated in regions where the focus crops were 
produced or where key stakeholders were concentrated. In Kenya, this meant that fieldwork was 
concentrated in two of the country’s major potato-producing areas (Meru and Nakuru counties) and the 
capital city, Nairobi. In Nigeria, focus was placed on key cassava-producing areas (Kaduna, Nasarawa, 
Niger, Ogun, and Oyo states); the capital city, Abuja, where key national agencies are based; and Ibadan, 
a cassava research hub. In Vietnam, emphasis was given to the major cassava-producing areas (Tay Ninh) 
and two potato-producing areas (Dalat and Dong Nai); the capital city, Hanoi; and the major commercial 
hub, Ho Chi Minh City. KIIs and FGDs lasted between one and a half and two hours. Although almost all 
interviews were held in English, several interviews were also conducted in other languages, with or 
without the assistance of professional translators, depending on the situation. A total of 95 semistructured 
interviews involving 241 individuals were conducted (Table 3). 
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Table 3 Organizations and individuals interviewed, by country 
Classification of interviewed organization or 
individual 
No. of interviews conducted 
  Kenya Nigeria Vietnam Total 
No. Category Org Ind Org Ind Org Ind Org Ind 
1 Policymakers, advisors, and regulators 5 14 4 28 5 17 14 59 
2 Public research agencies, institutes, 
centers, and stations 4 11 7 67 5 13 16 91 
3 Individual and small-scale seed 
entrepreneurs and enterprises 6 18 41 41 6 7 53 66 
4 Private companies and industry 
associations 9 15 1 8 2 2 12 25 
 Total 24 58 52 77 18 39 95 241 
Source: Authors. 




Although care was taken by the research teams to minimize bias, there may be several sources of 
bias in the study, many of which are common to qualitative research of this nature. First, though the 
research teams interviewed all relevant organizations in Categories 1, 2, and 4 (effectively conducting 
censuses in each country) to the extent possible, interviewees in Category 3 were sampled from a larger, 
often unknown, population. Sampling necessarily raises the issue of bias. To minimize sampling bias, 
each country research team followed a similar selection process to the best of its abilities, focusing its 
interviews of cassava and potato entrepreneurs and enterprises on those who could potentially provide 
critical insights on the research questions. In some instances, this may have led the research teams to 
interview participants who were involved, either directly or indirectly, with the researchers’ own 
institutions or projects. To minimize this potential source of bias, concerted efforts were made throughout 
the project’s field activities to identify interviewees who were unrelated to or independent of the research 
teams’ institutions or projects. Additionally, insights gained from interviewees were considered and 
triangulated against farm-household survey data, where available and relevant. 
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Second, by choosing the main production regions for the selected crops, the research team may 
have generated limited insight into the more marginal regions, where production, consumption, and 
market conditions varied significantly from the most common conditions.  
Third, in all three countries, some members of the research team relied on translation when the 
participant did not speak English. In Vietnam, professional translation services were employed, while in 
the other countries, research team members or field assistants provided translation. At multiple points 
during the project, the research team held discussions to reflect on the implications of these potential 
biases and to review field notes, internal team correspondence, and written analyses to flag and remedy 
such biases. 
Fourth seed users (farmers) were not included among study respondents shown in Table 3. In 
fact, farmers were interviewed in each country on their seed sources, uses, and preferences, either during 
the study or in related research projects that were used to inform this study (i.e., secondary data). The 
interviews conducted during this study did not follow a strict sampling procedure because the sheer 
magnitude of an unbiased sampling of farmers for each case study would have exceeded available 
resources. Therefore, we do not highlight findings from our interviews conducted with farmers, and 
instead rely on secondary data wherever possible. 
The interviews were augmented by the collection and analysis of legislative documents, 
regulatory handbooks, technical manuals, project reports, research papers, economic and agricultural 
statistics, and other documents relating to agricultural development policy, seed systems regulation, and 
related issues. Many of these documents were collected from government agencies and websites, although 
material was also garnered from donor agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and companies. It is 
worth noting that in all three countries, there is relatively more material available on projects to promote 
improved cassava and potato varieties than on the structure and performance of the seed systems for these 
crops. 
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BACKGROUND: COUNTRIES, CROPS, AND CONTEXT 
Potato in Kenya 
 
Potato is Kenya’s second most important food staple crop after maize (Kenya, MoALF 2016; Muthoni 
and Nyamongo 2009). Approximately 2–3 million tons6 of potatoes, worth about 40–50 billion Kenyan 
shillings (KSh; approximately US$40–50 million), are produced each year (Kenya, MoALF 2016). 
Cultivation is undertaken by just a few large-scale ware-7 and seed-producing farms, and an estimated 
800,000 small-scale farmers located across 16 counties and cultivating the crop on land units averaging 
just 0.4–0.6 hectares (Tesfaye et al. 2010). Potato yields in Kenya typically range between 8 and 10 tons 
per hectare, well below the average yields of 40 tons per hectare in developed countries, but on par with 
the average in Africa south of the Sahara (Okello et al. 2017; Harahagazwe et al. 2018; Muthoni, 
Shimelis, and Melis 2013; Gildemacher et al. 2011). About 90 percent of these potato farmers cultivate 
the crop for both own consumption and income generation (Muthoni, Shimelis, and Melis 2013). An 
estimated 2.5 million farmers are also employed in Kenya’s potato value chain, with considerable 
prospects for growth in the food processing industry (Kenya, MoALFI 2018; Laibuni and Omiti 2014).  
The government of Kenya has articulated plans to expand potato production area, volume, and 
value, most recently in the National Potato Strategy (2016); the Big Four Agenda, a presidential initiative 
that highlights food security as a national priority (2017); and the Agricultural Sector Transformation and 
Growth Strategy (ASTGS) (2018). These plans require quality seed, an input that is in short supply 
throughout the country. In fact, the certified seed potato market in Kenya is extremely small: just 6,714 
tons of seed produced on 403 hectares were certified in 2017. The parastatal Agricultural Development 
Corporation (ADC) and two private seed companies (Kisima Farms Ltd. and Charvi Ltd.) accounted for 
more than 75 percent of Kenya’s certified seed potato production in 2017. When measured as a share of 
all seed potato sown by farmers in Kenya (irrespective of quality), this volume represents just 4–5 percent 
 
6 Tons refers to metric tons throughout this paper. 
7 Ware potatoes are those used for human consumption or for processing into other food or industrial products, rather than for 
seed.  
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of the estimated market (Muthoni, Shimelis, and Melis 2013; Schulte-Geldermann et al. 2013; 
Gildemacher et al. 2009).  
Not surprisingly, most smallholders source seed from their own farms, from neighbors, or from 
market agents selling small ware potatoes as seed. Gildemacher et al. (2009) reported that 41 percent of 
potato farmers in Kenya periodically renew their seed after six seasons. Research indicates that these 
informal exchanges may contribute significantly to the spread of seedborne diseases and the persistence 
of soilborne diseases that reduce yields—namely, bacteria wilt, late blight, and more recently, potato cyst 
nematode (PCN) (Kaguongo et al. 2014; Muthoni, Shimelis, and Melis 2013). 
The legislation governing Kenya’s seed sector is the Seeds and Plant Varieties Act (1972) and its 
subsidiary regulations, guidelines, amendments, and revisions. The law clearly states that uncertified seed 
is illegal in Kenya: no person may sell seed of a species that requires compulsory seed certification 
(known as “schedule 2” crops, which includes potato), unless it has been certified or otherwise meets a 
minimum standard prescribed for the class and species. Of course, ground realities depart widely from 
written law; farmers buy and sell seed potato among themselves, and NGOs, charitable foundations, and 
research organizations train farmers in how to produce and distribute high-quality but uncertified 
(“clean”) seed potato. 
Meanwhile, Kenya’s seed policies and regulations continue to evolve with a growing focus on the 
formal seed market, with important implications for potato and other VPCs. The most recent amendments 
to the act (and its related policies, regulations, and guidelines) aimed to bring Kenya’s seed policies into 
closer alignment with international seed standards, domesticate regional obligations related to harmonized 
seed regulations, and highlight the role of certified seed in addressing emerging pests and diseases. These 
amendments have been central to the Kenyan government’s efforts to attract private investment—
particularly foreign private investment—into Kenya’s seed sector. Meanwhile, Kenya’s transition to a 
new constitution in 2010 shifted a significant share of responsibilities for policy implementation—
including seed policy implementation—from the central government to county governments, although the 
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Kenya Plant Health Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS) still maintains a central role as the country’s 
autonomous regulatory entity in charge of seed certification and phytosanitation.  
Cassava in Nigeria 
 
Nigeria is the world’s largest producer of cassava (Table 1), accounting for roughly 20 percent of the 
global cassava production. The crop is largely produced by farm households throughout much of the 
country as a staple food crop and as a source of income. It is also an increasingly important feedstock in 
agro-industrial processing (Wossen et al. 2017; Alene et al. 2012; Dixon et al. 2011). Yet Nigeria’s 
cassava yields are at most half of the yields achieved in other major cassava-producing countries such as 
Thailand, Ghana, and Vietnam (FAO 2020; Wossen et al. 2019).  
Nigeria’s cassava seed system remains largely informal. Still, the use of stems from farmers’ own 
production or local exchanges is the norm, contributing to the transmission of yield-reducing pests and 
diseases (Rabbi et al. 2015; Kapinga 2013; Gibson et al. 2009). Wossen et al. (2017) reported that 
although about 60 percent of farmers in Nigeria cultivate improved cassava varieties, most rely on this 
informal system to obtain seed. Specifically, they found that stems saved from their own crops or 
obtained from friends, relatives, or neighbors are the primary planting materials for about 70 percent of all 
cassava farmers, while an additional 6 percent obtained materials from local markets, and 17 percent from 
semiformal and formal sources such as government extension services, research institutions, and 
processors. 
Like Kenya, the seed system in Nigeria is governed by a legal framework. This framework was 
initially set forth in the 1992 National Agricultural Seeds Act (Decree no. 72) and, with subsequent 
amendments, formally established the laws governing the national seed system and the public agencies 
required to manage this system, including the National Agricultural Seed Council (NASC), which serves 
as Nigeria’s main regulator for seed quality assurance. The 1992 act was replaced by the 2019 National 
Agricultural Seeds Act, which came into effect in May 2020, after this study was conducted. The 2019 act 
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includes several changes to the 1992 act worth noting: recognition of third-party certification, increased 
penalties for counterfeiting, and recognition of propagation materials as “seed” for certification of VPCs. 
But Nigeria’s cassava seed system is distinguished more by programs and projects than by legal 
frameworks. Early efforts to create a functional seed system date back at least to the 1970s, when the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and the National Root Crops Research Institute bred 
tropical manioc selection varieties that were resistant to cassava mosaic virus disease (CMD) (Nweke 
2010; Nweke et al. 2002). During the 1980s, NGOs such as Catholic Relief Service and international 
development organizations such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development played a key role 
in distributing these varieties to farmers throughout the country’s cassava-growing regions, often working 
alongside various government development agencies.  
In the early 2000s, several programs furthered efforts to create a more formal seed system for 
cassava: the Root and Tuber Expansion Program initiated under the 2002 Presidential Initiative on 
Cassava and the Cassava Transformation Agenda of the 2011 Agricultural Transformation Agenda 
(Donkor et al. 2017). These initiatives prioritized the distribution of improved cassava varieties, pursued 
regulatory reforms in the seed system, and created incentives to stimulate private investment in cassava 
processing. They were followed by initiatives such as the High-Quality Cassava Flour initiative, which 
aimed to substitute 10 percent of wheat flour used in breadmaking and other value-addition processes 
with cassava flour; the Cassava Bread Development Fund, which provided funds to help increase demand 
for quality cassava as a feedstock for agroprocessing; and the Growth Enhancement Scheme, a targeted-
input subsidy program that distributed improved cassava varieties (FMARD 2014; Asante-Pok 2013). 
More recently, a number of projects have been undertaken to improve the distribution of new varieties 
and clean planting material, with specific emphasis on creating more sustainable and commercial 
pathways.  
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Potato and Cassava in Vietnam 
 
While both cassava and potato are referenced in Vietnam’s various strategies for economic growth and 
agricultural development, they are not major crops in the country. The respective area under cassava and 
potato in the country totaled 513,000 hectares and 24,700 hectares in 2018, while respective yields were 
just 19 and 15 tons per hectare (FAO 2020). Moreover, the targets set for their expansion are far more 
modest than those set for other food staple and high-value export crops. 
These aggregate figures for cassava and potato mask a healthy rate of growth in production, 
consumption, and use of these crops, especially for cassava. Between 2000 and 2016, the area under 
cassava cultivation increased from about 237,000 hectares to a peak of 570,000 hectares, while 
production increased more than eightfold, from around 2 million tons to 11 million tons, indicating a 
more than doubling of yields that is substantially attributable to the introduction of high-yielding varieties 
(FAO 2020; Le et al. 2019). In 2016, 70 percent of the country’s cassava production was exported in the 
form of starch or chips for use in processed food, animal feed, pharmaceuticals, and industrial alcohol 
production (ITC 2018). These exports—88 percent of which were destined for China—generated more 
than US$700 million in revenues in that same year.  
Potato in Vietnam offers a very different story. Since the mid-1980s, planting has stagnated at the 
20,000 hectare mark and production has stalled at about 300,000 tons (FAO 2020). Yet increasing 
demand from consumers and the food processing industry has led to sizable increases in imports: between 
2001 and 2016, potato imports increased 24-fold from 1,574 to 39,700 tons, the vast majority of which 
originated from China (ITC 2018).  
The seed systems for these crops also vary in Vietnam. The cassava seed system is almost 
entirely informal: Le et al. (2019) found that in 2016, 90 percent of cassava farmers obtained their initial 
planting material through informal exchanges. The seed potato system relies on more formal sources: in 
2016, Vietnam imported 3,650 tons of seed potato from Germany, South Korea, China, the Netherlands, 
and Canada. A significant share of these imports are likely further multiplied domestically, and additional 
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but unknown quantities of seed may also come from China in the form of small ware potato that is also 
used for planting.  
For both crops, Vietnam’s seed system is governed by laws and regulation that were first 
formulated in 1996 (Decree No. 07/1996/ND-CP), which focused mainly on varietal improvement, seed 
quality, and rapid multiplication. The decree establishes that only certified seed may be legally traded and 
strictly forbids the production and trade of “fake seeds, seeds of poor quality, mixed seeds, seeds with 
pest or disease germs or seeds which have not been certified” (Article 13, Decree No. 07/1996/ND-CP). 
Subsequent legislation provides guidance on seed production, quality standards, plant variety protection, 
and other essential elements of a robust seed system. 
Uniquely, in 2008 the Vietnam Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) issued 
Decision 35/2008/QĐ-BNN, which explicitly permits farmers to collect, store, preserve, use, and 
distribute local plant varieties and genetic resources, and makes farmers eligible for public financial 
support for their seed production activities (Tin et al. 2011). Although this decision still prevents farmers 
from engaging in commercial seed activities, it does provide recognition to the informal seed sector (Lua 
et al. 2015). Moreover, it implicitly acknowledges that many farmers already engage in what might be 
described as commercial seed exchanges with fellow farmers at the local level.  
 
Generalizability and Context Specificity 
 
Across all four crop-country combinations, we observe several attributes that are generalizable to all 
VPCs. First, each country hosts a legal and regulatory framework governing the seed system; a research 
system that breeds new crop varieties; a public regulatory body that certifies seed; some combination of 
public and private seed producers; public agencies, public programs, private companies, and other entities 
that distribute or market seed to farmers; and widespread practices of farmer seed saving, farmer-to-
farmer seed exchanges, and seed exchanges in markets. The extent to which this structure caters 
specifically to VPC seed varies by country and crop.  
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Specifically, variations exist between the selected crop-country combinations in terms of each 
crop’s use and importance to the economy and society; each crop’s prominence in the country’s economic 
growth, trade, and agricultural development strategies and policies; the role, authority, and autonomy of 
the regulatory body; the relative importance of actors involved in varietal improvement, seed production, 
and seed distribution; the degree of integration between formal and informal seed systems; and the social 
and cultural practices in production and consumption. Variations also exist in terms of the crop’s 
importance as a traded commodity and the international trade context within which the country operates. 
We draw on many of these differences in our discussion in the sections that follow.  
 Figure 1 provides a broad and generalized schematic of how VPC seed systems function, at least 
for the crops and countries that are the focus of this study. The diagram’s complexity highlights the 
multiple channels through which seed is distributed: through state-owned seed producers, public seed 
distribution programs, and farmer-based organizations; through domestic and foreign firms; and through 
traders, retailers, and entrepreneurs of varying sizes and scales. The figure also highlights the many 
qualities of seed that are distributed through this system, ranging from early-generation seed used in 
public breeding programs and research centers, to certified or quality-declared seed that is approved by 
various regulatory agencies (denoted in gray boxes), to seed that is saved and exchanged by farmers 
themselves. Finally, the figure highlights the diverse contributions of farmers to seed production and 
use—as contract seed multipliers, as commercial producers in their own right, as conservators of genetic 
diversity,8 and as seed consumers in the system. Taken together, these relationships emphasize the 
intertwined nature of VPC seed systems and the close interactions between what are often referred to as 
formal and informal systems (Louwaars, de Boef, and Edeme 2013; Almekinders and Louwaars 2002). 
Although the actors, functions, and relationships featured in this schematic may not be present in each 
 
8 Note that none of our three focal countries are centers of genetic diversity for either cassava or potato. Thus, landraces and 
genetic diversity conservation may be less central to these seed systems when compared with other countries and crops—for 
example, potato in Peru, where farmers and communities play a central role in the conservation of potato landraces as part of the 
wider potato seed system. 
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crop-country case examined in this study,9 the schematic represents a model of a VPC seed system and 
suggests multiple intervention points through which the system can be influenced or improved. 
 




Note: Solid lines denote seed used in cultivation. The weight of each line denotes indicative volumes of seed 
moving through the indicated channel. Large dashed lines indicate regulatory channels, small dotted lines indicate 
channels for early-generation seed movement, and smaller dotted lines indicate farmer production and supply of 
seed-to-seed providers.  
 
 
9 Importantly, political economy actors and actor coalitions—including industry, farmer, consumer, and environmental groups 
that have influence over the design of seed systems policy and regulation—are considered outside the boundaries of this 
particular schematic. However, their role and influence are addressed in subsequent sections of this paper.  
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FINDINGS 
Our presentation of key findings is organized as follows. First, we provide a basic comparison of VPC 
seed policies across countries and crops to illustrate the considerable diversity in regulatory approaches to 
quality assurance. Second, we examine these policies in the context of each country’s broader strategic 
framework for economic growth, agricultural development, food security, and seed market strengthening, 
with a specific emphasis on the contested narratives around these frameworks. Third, we examine how 
actor coalitions and networks form around these narratives and advance their interests. Finally, we discuss 
the potential impact of these actor coalitions, contested narratives, and regulatory diversity on the 
availability of quality VPC for small-scale, resource-poor farmers in the three focal countries. 
Regulatory Diversity and Commonality across Crops and Countries 
 
First and foremost, findings indicate that whereas there are several common features in the regulatory 
approaches taken to VPC seed quality assurance in the crop-country combinations, the variations are also 
significant. As a starting point, we observe a common strategy across all crop-country combinations: in 
the absence of sufficient capacity and effective regulatory systems, breeding programs and research 
centers themselves are often directly engaged in the production and distribution of quality seed, and often 
provide support to quality assurance processes in the production of seed by commercial providers. Of 
course, we recognize that ensuring seed health—specifically, the health of early-generation seed—is a 
core function of breeding programs and research centers. Because these programs and centers are often 
the first line of defense against seed- or soilborne pests and diseases, these entities have a keen interest in 
seed health at all levels of the seed system. However, it may also be the case that large-scale seed 
production and distribution to farmers lies outside of these organizations’ mandate, comparative 
advantage, technical capacity, and budgetary resources. Such efforts to simultaneously address plant 
breeding, seed health, and large-scale seed distribution are evident in Nigeria, where there are efforts to 
breed varieties resistant to CMD and to rapidly distribute stems containing multiple desirable plant 
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qualities, depending on the source, program, and channel. A similar situation is observed in Vietnam, 
where the national research system distributes quality (but uncertified) seed potato as well as CMD-
resistant cassava varieties, and in Kenya, where the country’s potato breeding program is investing in the 
development and distribution of varieties that are resistant to bacterial wilt, late blight, and PCN.  
The second common strategy for providing farmers with quality seed is the promotion of good 
on-farm management practices for crops and soils, coupled with the promotion of good management 
practices in the preparation of farmers’ own saved seeds and those of small-scale seed production 
associations and enterprises. This component of an integrated seed health approach (Thomas-Sharma et 
al. 2017) is best illustrated in seed potato projects in Kenya organized by various national and 
international organizations, which create and train village-based extension workers and self-help groups 
in seed potato production. Nigeria uses a similar approach of creating and training village seed 
entrepreneurs (VSEs) for cassava stem multiplication.10 Of particular interest is the considerable extent to 
which government agencies—county agricultural extension services in Kenya and state agricultural 
development programs in Nigeria—participate in these projects despite regulations that discourage small-
scale production of noncertified seed for both crops. The exigencies of market demand and project 
funding may simply overshadow regulations in such cases, thereby providing tacit state recognition of the 
informal VPC seed system. But the cost-effectiveness and sustainability of this strategy remain to be seen. 
A third strategy employed is the practice of quarantining, destroying, or otherwise removing 
crops deemed to be acutely infected by pests or diseases. In Vietnam, where this practice is observed most 
significantly, the government’s primary regulatory instrument is reactive: monitoring pest and disease 
outbreaks, destroying infected and quarantined cropland, and continued monitoring after outbreaks or 
proliferations of suspicious seed lots. Such was the strategy taken in response to the CMD outbreak noted 
above and to ware potatoes imported from China and used as seed but thought to be of low or unknown 
 
10 In Kenya, partners in these types of projects include the International Potato Center (CIP), the Syngenta Foundation for 
Sustainable Agriculture, Farm Input Promotions Africa Ltd., and Kisima Farm Ltd., among others. In Nigeria, partners include 
IITA, Catholic Relief Services, and the Justice, Development, and Peace Commission, among others. 
 21 
quality.11 While these strategies—especially Vietnam’s strategy—bear low administrative costs, their 
broader economic and social consequences may be nontrivial.  
A fourth strategy is illustrated by Vietnam’s approach to seed potato, a strategy that is also being 
pursued in Kenya. Vietnam relies extensively on imports of certified seed potato from European and other 
countries where high-quality material is commercially available, particularly for varieties used in the food 
processing industry. In effect, Vietnam recognizes its comparative disadvantage in seed potato 
production, and relies instead on trade with Europe to provide quality seed potato to farmers, going as far 
as to subsidize these imports for farmers. Although this strategy does not preclude the importation of 
noncertified or substandard materials through other channels (e.g., the cross-border trade in ware potato 
with China that also provides an implicit supply of seed potato) or public- and private-sector efforts to 
improve the quality of domestic seed production, it does place an emphasis on quality assurance. Kenya, 
which similarly imports certified seed from Europe, has occasionally taken the opposite approach, 
rejecting the quality assurances provided by the European seed potato producers. 
A fifth strategy employed by all countries is the formal inspection and certification of seed. 
Among the three countries studied here, Kenya has what is arguably the most effective seed regulator: 
KEPHIS. Yet even KEPHIS’s capacity to monitor, inspect, and certify seed production is limited when it 
comes to VPCs. At present, its operations related to seed potato are limited to inspection of the state-
owned ADC and a small number of private companies. KEPHIS has neither the resources nor the 
personnel to monitor and inspect small-scale seed potato producers, even with the recent decentralization 
of inspection offices in major ware production areas and with the use of private, accredited inspectors. 
However, in effect, KEPHIS’s focus is still limited to the formal seed potato sector, representing just 4–5 
percent of the total market. 
 
11 In Kenya, KEPHIS has employed similar practices as part of its formal inspection and certification system, which more closely 
aligns to the fifth strategy listed below. KEPHIS’s practices include the rejection and destruction of seed potato lots on seed 
providers’ production facilities or, for imported seed, at port. Such seed potato has also been sold in Kenya as ware in 
geographies where potato is not cultivated. 
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Overall, we find that each seed quality assurance strategy described above is associated with 
some cost, whether measured in terms of public expenditure on research, extension, and regulation, or in 
terms of social and economic value. In Figure 2, we provide a stylized mapping of each strategy to supply 
quality seed and combat pest and disease pressures against the notional public expenditure requirements 
in the short to medium term. On the cost side, we consider that both phytosanitary inspection of seed 
imports and the quarantining and destruction of affected standing crops incur a lower cost than breeding 
programs for host resistance and extension programs to improve farmer management practices. That said, 
it may be the case that breeding for host resistance and extension services are actually lower-cost and 
higher-return investments than inspections and quarantining, particularly when considered in terms of 
per-unit cost (i.e., the cost per unit of seed distributed or area planted).  
Figure 2. A stylized mapping of VPC seed quality assurance systems against pest and disease 




We also consider strategies in terms of their capacity to address pest and disease pressures. 
Although certified seed imported from countries with highly effective regulatory systems might seem like 
a means of combating pest and disease pressures, experiences with seed potato imported by Kenya and 
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Vietnam may suggest the opposite (i.e., pathogens may have been introduced through these import 
channels). This issue indicates some ambiguity—or a lack of coordination—in how countries deal with 
imported and domestically certified seed with respect to pest and disease management. Drawing on the 
historical record for cassava, we also consider breeding to be among the more effective approaches to 
controlling pest and disease resistance. This assessment may be especially true if we expand the definition 
of breeding to include research more broadly, thereby encompassing the biological control systems 
developed to contain mealybugs, a pernicious pest that causes serious damage to cassava (Nweke 2010).  
Furthermore, it may often be the case that that these strategies may be close substitutes or 
complements, implying both trade-offs and synergies. For instance, it is possible that a strategy focused 
on breeding for host resistance can render a strong inspection and certification strategy less necessary and 
more costly, indicating that the two strategies are near substitutes.12 Similarly, it is possible that investing 
in improved crop management among farmers works best when combined with farmers’ use of certified 
seed, indicating complementarities. These trade-offs and synergies have further implications for pressures 
related to cost and those involving the rate of pest and disease occurrence.  
Relatedly, we find that no single country employs one strategy exclusively. Kenya, for example, 
manages a research system and regulatory body that together demonstrate a potential strategy to supply 
quality seed potato and manage pest and disease pressures, albeit only within the formal commercial 
market at the moment. Nigeria’s research system, state extension programs, development projects, and 
government initiatives have historically shown impressive impacts and may hold even greater potential at 
scale in the future. Vietnam’s “quarantine and destroy” strategy, while possibly quite draconian, is offset, 
in the case of potato, by European imports of quality seed potato. In sum, seed quality assurance systems 
for VPC crops cannot rely exclusively on regulation; public investment in research and extension, 
accommodating trade policies, and active surveillance of plant health may all have an additional role to 
 
12 As pointed out by several reviewers, host resistance may vary across varieties of a specific crop, resulting in the continued 
need for an inspection and certification system, especially where such systems also prioritize assessments of trueness to type and 
other important factors. 
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play. And in the case of VPCs, some combination of these latter strategies may actually play a more 
important role than a strict regulatory system itself.  
Finally, we find that these strategies are, in general, highly derivative of strategies designed for 
seed quality assurance in cereals and the pest and disease threats to cereals. For example, a close reading 
of the amendments to Kenya’s seed regulatory framework since 2010 indicates that changes were drawn 
from requirements for maize, for which production can be more readily centralized and where 
interseasonal storage is less of an issue than it is with VPCs. As a result, the language often refers to seed 
lots, germination tests, inspection frequency, and sampling schemes that are appropriate for maize and 
other cereals but less so for potato and other VPCs. Similarly, references to the number of allowable 
generations from breeder to certified seed that can be multiplied are drawn from standard practices for 
hybrid maize, where a small number of generations between breeder and certified seed is desirable. This 
practice is inapplicable to potato, which is clonally propagated and thus less prone to genetic erosion, and 
also has a low multiplication rate that restricts the number of generations allowed in a seed class and thus 
reduces the profitability of seed production. On the implementation side of these seed regulations, there 
are reports of arduous and costly procedures and long delays for registration and inspection, coupled with 
limited capacity of the seed regulators, who are more familiar with the seed production, varieties, and pest 
and disease characteristics of cereal crops. These realities tend to discourage potential entrants, especially 
smallholder seed producers, and pose challenges for seed inspection and certification. 
Competing Narratives and Diverse Actor Coalitions 
 
In several of the crop-country combinations, findings suggest the coexistence of competing narratives on 
the role of policy and regulation in VPC seed system development. While it may be difficult to assess the 
relative power or weight of these competing narratives given biases in data collected from KIIs and 
FGDs, we illustrate the key framings and actor coalitions behind these narratives in our four crop-country 
combinations.  
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The primary narrative across all three countries is what we describe as the “food security first” 
framing. In Kenya, for example, the current overarching strategy for economic growth (the Big Four 
Agenda) and agricultural development (the ASTGS) approach seed primarily through a food security lens. 
This focus means prioritizing seed policies, regulations, and investments that close yield gaps, increase 
crop production, and reduce food prices to ensure affordable subsistence for the country’s growing 
population. As a result, many of the line ministries and agencies directly involved in agriculture view seed 
systems development through a similar lens, believing that seed systems exist to provide farmers with 
affordable access to improved varieties and quality planting material. Such was the general reflection 
from key informants affiliated with county governments (both administrative and extension staff), and the 
federal Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (MoALF). The narrative is similar in Nigeria but 
far less so in Vietnam, given that neither cassava nor potato is considered food a security crop. 
The punchline of this narrative is that short-term increases in the supply of the highest seed 
quality possible to increase food production outweigh longer-term improvements in seed market 
functioning, rural enterprise development, and regulation. By extension, this narrative rationalizes public 
investment in seed production and distribution programs and state-owned enterprises, while catering to 
the short time horizons under which political leaders often operate and their preference for observable 
results within these short horizons.  
The opposing narrative common to all three countries might be termed the “regulator first” or 
“pest- and disease-risk mitigation first” framing. Its underlying narrative emphasizes the need to prevent 
seed producers and retailers from providing farmers with seed of a low or unknown quality level. Thus, it 
may be more accurately framed as the need to regulate quality more effectively, without reference to 
malfeasance. In Kenya, for example, several key informants affiliated with research, regulation, private 
investment, and certain donor-funded projects argued that only certified seed potato could prevent the 
spread of pests and disease to protect national potato production and yields.13 But supporters of this 
 
13 While this view is sometimes framed as the need to control the proliferation of counterfeit or fraudulent seed in the market, 
there is little evidence to suggest rent-seeking behavior of this nature in the markets for VPC seed in the focal countries. 
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narrative do not recognize that the demand for seed from the farmers far exceeds the regulatory capacity 
of the countries to inspect and approve seed for sale as certified in sufficient quantities. Insufficient 
quantities of certified seed may raise seed prices to rates that are not affordable to small-scale farmers or 
may cause farmers to rely on their saved seed as planting material, which contributes to the problem of 
pest and disease, ultimately affecting potato production and yields. 
A “private investment” framing suggests that the design and enforcement of quality assurance 
regulations is essential to encouraging private investment in each country’s seed market. In Kenya, the 
framing splits between “foreign private investment” and “domestic private investment.” The former is 
characterized by foreign firms seeking plant variety protections and easy navigation through 
phytosanitary inspections and quarantines for imported seed or seeking inputs for vertically integrated 
production systems (e.g., potatoes for chips and fries in their food outlets). The latter is characterized by 
domestic firms seeking more effective and lower-cost inspection and certification procedures and, in 
certain instances, infant industry protections from foreign competition, as well as firms in agroprocessing 
with varying degrees of vertical integration.  
Yet another narrative is what we might describe as the “grassroots projects” framing, which is 
closely related to the “food security framing” discussed earlier. Its underlying narrative holds that 
noncertified, farmer-managed production of clean seed is a feasible standard to promote, that pragmatic 
and decentralized alternatives to a strict regulatory system exist, and that yield gains will contribute to 
improvements in rural livelihoods over a longer time period than policymakers or regulators may be 
willing to accommodate. Again, the VSE model of cassava seed production in Nigeria and the village-
based advisors and self-help groups for seed potato production in Kenya are useful examples. Their 
approach hinges on investments in technical capacity and strong self-regulation norms to encourage the 
growth of localized VPC seed systems and markets.  
In each country, the actor coalitions and networks that subscribe to these framings are fluid, as is 
the distribution of power among them. Several findings emerge from our observations and analysis. First, 
in both Kenya and Vietnam, there is a strong coalition around private investment in their respective seed 
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sectors, advanced by a coalition of both foreign and domestic interests and policymakers. The revisions to 
Kenya’s seed regulatory framework since 2010 illustrate this coalition, with an almost exclusive focus on 
increasing foreign and domestic private investment in Kenya’s seed sector (Munyi and De Jonge 2015). 
Yet these coalitions are themselves fairly tenuous. With respect to potato in Kenya, we observe 
bilateral development agencies supporting their private-sector counterparts to advance plant variety 
protection legislation and guidelines, to strengthen the regulatory standards and capacities, and to increase 
the availability of varieties and seed for potatoes used in processing and food retailing. Not surprisingly, 
neither coalition exhibits much interest in the efficiencies associated with competitive markets; rather, 
each is aiming to secure market power through favorable policy and regulation, often pitted against those 
organizations dedicated to developing more local, farmer-based seed systems.  
Moreover, there are significant absences in these coalitions, reflecting little of the growing body 
of theory and evidence suggesting that technological change at the farm level will be driven by demand 
from actors further along the value chain (Reardon and Timmer 2012). For example, in the case of 
cassava in Vietnam, we see little evidence of a role played by starch factories in the provision of either 
improved varieties or quality seed to farmers that supply their feedstock. Similarly, in Nigeria, we see 
little evidence that enterprise development initiatives meant to increase cassava’s use in processing and 
food preparation have had much influence on either varietal change or seed quality assurance systems. 
This lack of influence may reflect any number of factors, such as the rudimentary nature or nascent 
development of these industries; one might argue that neither industrial starch factories nor gari 
processors are particularly discerning about the quality of their feedstock. Or it might reflect a strongly 
segmented market in which value chain actors have little influence on seed quality among smallholders 
because smallholders cultivate varieties that are preferred for home consumption but not valued by 
processing or food retail operations. Or it may simply be that either the varieties in use are resistant to 
major pathogens affecting seed or the pathogens are not particularly problematic to farmers or other value 
chain actors.  
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We also observe that government actors—policymakers, public researchers, and regulators—do 
not necessarily play the role of “benevolent social planners” or present themselves as a single-actor 
coalition. In each crop-country combination, government actors subscribe to one or several of the 
framings above and participate in coalitions to advance the associated narrative. The divergence between 
policy actors and regulators is observed in the case of Kenya. In Nigeria, the case is less clear: regulators 
seem to take a more pragmatic perspective on seed system development—acknowledging that regulation 
of the entire cassava seed system is a Sisyphean task—that falls closely in line with the views of policy 
actors. Meanwhile, in Vietnam, there is little sense of any discord among government actors. 
 Last, we observe that national advocacy groups—seed trade and crop grower associations—play 
a relatively limited role in these coalitions. In some instances, they are merely extensions of government 
or donor interests. In other cases, they represent just a subset of private-sector interests (foreign or 
domestic). And rarely do these groups provide effective representation of farmers themselves, whether as 
producers of seed or of crops. That said, in the case of Kenya we do observe a fairly active set of such 
groups playing an advocacy role within one of the many coalitions described above, several of which are 
constructively contributing to the design and formulation of seed regulations through various stakeholder 
engagements. But we see little leadership from the national research organizations and policy think tanks 
in providing data and analysis that might contribute to these debates and guide VPC seed regulatory 
reform—with the possible exception of Kenya, where several domestic and foreign organizations actively 
engage. 
Drivers of Change: Organization, Technology, Trade, and Crisis 
 
Extending this analysis of competing narratives and actor coalitions, we identify here several key drivers 
of policy and regulatory change for the crop-country combinations examined in this study. First, we 
examine several institutional factors and organizational innovations that are affecting policy, regulation, 
and ultimately, the potential for VPC seed market growth. Second, we highlight several technological 
opportunities that may drive similar outcomes, followed by emerging market and trade factors affecting 
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policy, regulation, and market growth potential. Finally, we explore the effect of crisis and related 
responses on these same outcomes. 
 From an institutional and organizational perspective, the one significant factor observed in 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Vietnam is the role of the state and, specifically, the state’s regulatory apparatus. 
Although KEPHIS in Kenya, NASC in Nigeria, and MARD in Vietnam operate quite differently—each 
with its own level of independence, autonomy, coverage, and technical capacity—they embody the 
strength of the state’s regulatory powers. The rules, guidelines, and procedures that they are charged with 
executing play a fundamentally important role in shaping the market for VPC planting material. This 
authority has allowed them to introduce several simple innovations with potentially far-reaching 
consequences for regulation. For example, KEPHIS has been able to adapt its regulatory infrastructure to 
the constitutional devolution of administrative powers to the county level, allowing the regulator to 
extend its reach and support county-led initiatives in seed production and distribution. KEPHIS is also 
implementing the use of accredited private seed inspectors, with the first rounds of inspectors drawn from 
existing seed companies and trained to operate their companies’ internal quality assurance practices in 
compliance with KEPHIS’s standards and guidelines.14 The use of accredited private seed inspectors can 
potentially extend the reach of inspection agencies that are hobbled by limited personnel and 
infrastructure, although concerns remain about the potential for rent-seeking behavior in the absence of 
sufficient monitoring and oversight by these inspectors. 
On the technological front, efforts in Kenya to develop and scale the use of new seed production 
systems—advanced rapid propagation techniques such as the use of aeroponic systems for the production 
of mini-tubers and using transplanted tissue culture plantlets to produce rooted apical cuttings—are 
transforming the commercial viability of the certified seed potato industry and requiring regulators to 
adapt their regulations and guidelines to recognize these new technologies (Demo et al. 2015; Parker 
2019; Parker et al. 2019). In Nigeria, NASC’s Cassava Seed Tracker, developed by IITA, provides 
 
14 Future applications of this approach may allow accredited inspectors to provide services independently and commercially. 
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regulators and seed producers with an app to better coordinate seed production, inspection, and 
certification. Across all countries, key informants noted that low-cost field disease diagnostic kits may be 
poised to improve the accuracy and timeliness of inspection procedures. The effectiveness of these 
technologies has yet to be evaluated in terms of their impact on market size, seed product quality, on-farm 
productivity, or social and economic outcomes for smallholder farmers, but the impact pathways indicate 
considerable potential. 
Meanwhile, trade considerations are also driving change. Regional harmonization of seed 
regulations in eastern and southern Africa under the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and in western and central Africa under the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) offer Kenya and Nigeria—two of the largest economies in these regions—opportunities to 
expand their VPC seed products into neighboring countries, subject to the application of a well-defined 
quality assurance system. Vietnam, as a full-fledged member of the World Trade Organization and a 
keenly export-oriented economy, is also cognizant of trade considerations in seed-sector development—
although those concerns seem to revolve more around phytosanitary standards for imported seed, given 
that Vietnam does not prioritize either cassava or potato seed as potential export commodities. Still, 
compliance with the global trade regimes governing the seed industry—and, in particular, membership in 
the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants—is a significant element of 
Vietnam’s outlook on seed system policy.  
Interestingly, and as discussed above, we observe a marginal role played by industry and demand-
side factors as a driver of more effective VPC seed quality regulation. For example, one might expect 
fast-food retailers in Kenya and Vietnam to have an outsized influence on policy by demanding a 
regulatory system that ensures a steady supply of quality planting material for varieties specifically 
adapted to potato chip production. While that channel of influence does exist, its pressure on the 
regulatory system—as opposed to the varietal registration and release system—seems to be nominal. In 
other words, neither KEPHIS nor the wider potato production system in Kenya has reoriented itself to this 
“demand-pull” effect because it remains a relatively small niche in the larger market for potato. An even 
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more obvious illustration of the absence of this effect is observed in Vietnam, where cassava starch 
factories play no role in providing farmers with either quality stems or improved cassava varieties to 
accommodate their specific feedstock requirements. 
The single most common driver observed in the crop-country combinations covered by this study 
is crisis. The outbreak of a significant pest or disease threat tends to marshal significant regulatory 
responses. In Kenya, these threats are illustrated by the spread of bacterial wilt and PCN for potato; in 
Vietnam, by an outbreak of CMD for cassava and the spread of poor-quality imported potato used for 
seed; and in Nigeria, by the persistence (as opposed to an outbreak) of CMD. In each country, these 
threats have led to different responses. Vietnam pursued the “quarantine and destroy” strategy described 
earlier. Kenya doubled down on its zero-tolerance thresholds for infected planting material that was 
produced domestically or imported from Europe, much to the chagrin of private-sector seed producers 
and with little impact on the informal seed production system.  
Nigeria’s response to its ongoing crisis is slightly different: pragmatism. Given the seemingly 
intractable challenges of regulating a seed sector that easily reverts to an unregulated state, seed system 
actors in Nigeria have prioritized other crops, markets, and administrative issues, allocating quality 
assurance systems for cassava seed to the remit of researchers, technologists, and entrepreneurs, even in 
the presence of major cassava productivity initiatives by the government. This pragmatism is also implicit 
in the other crop-country combinations, where there exists a tolerance for—and even active support of—
informal seed systems. After all, maize in Kenya and rice in Vietnam are likely higher-order issues for 
most actors in the agriculture sector, whereas Nigeria has sufficient diversity in its agricultural sector to 
readily divert attention away from issues of cassava seed quality assurance. 
That is not to say that cassava or potato seed systems escape regulatory scrutiny entirely. In 
Kenya, public regulators and administrators at multiple levels have learned valuable lessons about how to 
control the proliferation of low-quality or fraudulent seed from past experiences in the maize seed sector, 
and they seem keen to apply those lessons to other crops and markets. And in both Kenya and Nigeria, the 
pressures emanating from the regional harmonization of seed regulations and regional trade integration 
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may cause these same regulators and administrators to move from rhetoric to action in the case of cassava 
and potato. Taken together, these trends suggest that VPC seed regulations are being shaped by 
regulators’ prior experience with cereal crops and trade concerns, with little recognition of the crop-
specific nature of seed systems and the possibilities for the coexistence of different systems and 




DISCUSSION AND POLICY OPTIONS  
Given the findings above, what are the options for improving policy and regulation for quality 
VPC planting material? We preface this discussion with a few important caveats. First, each crop and its 
seed system is context-specific, so options that might work in one market, agroecology, or country may 
need to be radically adapted to fit the needs of another. For this reason, we offer options below that draw 
on broad, shared principles but also require considerable adaption to context. Second, policy and 
regulatory reforms are not necessarily win-win solutions: gains for one actor in a seed system may come 
at the expenses of others. With this in mind, the options we propose below focus on the simple 
proposition that the benefits from the current seed systems in the crop-country combinations covered in 
this study are extremely limited, and that any expansion in market size will be generally welfare-
improving, with a bias toward smallholder farmers. Third, policy-change processes require political will, 
which is itself a function of the way actor coalitions compete or cooperate in the policy and regulatory 
space. We have described those forces in our findings and recognize that they are a strong undercurrent in 
the success or failure of the policy, regulatory, and investment options explored below. 
The main question raised by our findings is as follows: What type of policy and regulation is 
required for VPC seed quality assurance? We argue that a strict certification regime that mirrors cereal 
seed certification regimes is simply unfeasible for VPCs. We also argue that the same applies among VPC 
crops: some VPC varieties (e.g., seed potato in Kenya) offer farmers genetic gains or market value or 
both, whereas others (e.g., cassava in Nigeria) offer only occasional genetic improvements and limited 
market value. This variability suggests the need for crop- and context-specific policy and regulation for 
seed quality assurance. 
We observe very little articulation of demand for quality seed from farmers, industry, or 
consumers, and limited capacity to supply regulatory services—either by an external public regulator or 
by practices internal to the firm or producer—in the fragmented markets for VPC seed. This does not 
imply that there is no demand for quality seed among farmers in developing countries or that developing 
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countries should dispense with VPC seed regulations. Rather, it suggests that scarce public resources 
should be concentrated where they can have the most significant impact on seed quality. We outline 
several options below that highlight a suite of policy, regulatory, market, and technological 
recommendations, summarized in Table 4. Although our list does not rank these options per se, it does 
focus first on policy and regulatory recommendations—options that are more directly related to the aim of 
this study—followed by market and technology recommendations. 
At the broadest, most general level, our findings suggest that national policies and directives need 
to walk back the marginalization of informal VPC seed systems, including their criminalization of non-
certified VPC seed production and the strict demarcation of who can produce and distribute VPC seed. A 
more progressive policy regime that recognizes these informal seed systems and acknowledges the need 
to professionalize them with technical and financial support—rather than to replace or eliminate them—
provides further policy guidance that retreats from the rhetoric of the more contested and controversial 
framings and narratives described earlier. Of course, these recommendations are cosmetic at best: changes 
to the language in policy documents may be merely a de jure remedy that ultimately may have little 
bearing on de facto seed systems. But it may create a more permissive environment for public investment 
and regulation, and it may support the development of VPC seed markets. 
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Reform language in national policy on 
seed systems and markets 
Legalize informal VPC seed production and withdraw language that 
criminalizes informal VPC seed production and trade, where relevant; 
recognize informal seed production and trade as extant systems that 
require public and private support, not elimination or replacement. 
 
Prioritize public investment in early-
generation seed production 
Concentrate public spending on the production and distribution of 
high-quality early-generation seed in research centers, state-owned 
enterprises, government development programs, or through public-
private partnership arrangements. 
 
Introduce multiple or alternative seed 
quality categories 
Introduce quality-declared seed or similar categories, along with 
related standards and protocols for rural entrepreneurs and farmer-
based organizations, to complement existing classes of early-
generation seed. 
 
Decentralize regulation to local levels 
 
Pursue approaches that combine internal (producer-level) quality 
assurance systems with decentralized external regulatory oversight to 
accommodate the unique biological aspects of VPC seed. 
 
Increase use of accredited third-party 
quality assurance services  
Use accredited third-party inspection services, facilities, and 
inspectors or internal (firm-level) quality assurance systems to 
increase the coverage of regulatory oversight, given the need for 
decentralized regulation and limits on public resources. 
 
Invest in the development and use of 
seed traceability systems 
Invest public and private-sector resources in the design, testing, and 
application of seed traceability systems that track material from 
source to field, and possibly allow for monitoring of varietal adoption, 
quality seed use, and pest and disease susceptibilities.  
 
Harmonize national policy and regulation 
with regional and global standards 
Update national policy and regulations to align with commitments 
made under regional and global agreements on policy and regulatory 
harmonization of seed trade, with specific reference to VPCs.  
 
Provide subsidies to incentivize 
production, marketing, and use of quality 
seed  
Design and implement targeted subsidy programs that support seed 
producers, distributors, and/or farmers as a means of lowering costs 
and encouraging production and use of quality seed. 
 
Develop capacity of rural entrepreneurs 
and farmer-based organizations  
 
Develop capacity of entrepreneurs and farmer-based organizations 
through technical training, business services, and other support to 
produce, brand, and distribute seed in localized markets using high-
quality, early-generation seed; develop internal quality assurance 
practices and protocols. 
 
Strengthen risk assessment and 
communication for VPCs 
Develop more effective, farmer-facing tools to assess and 
communicate the technical, social, and economic risks of biotic and 
abiotic threats to VPC production and the contribution of quality seed 
to mitigating these risks. 
 
Invest public resources in breeding for 
host resistance 
Invest public resources in breeding programs that focus on host 





In terms of public investment prioritization, our findings suggest that greater public resources 
could be concentrated in strengthening quality control and quality assurance for early-generation seed 
production (i.e., in the seed classes that are produced by research centers, private firms, and NGOs as an 
input to the production of subsequent-generation seed that is ultimately sold to farmers). These classes 
include mini-tubers and rooted apical cuttings produced using more cost-effective rapid multiplication 
technologies that reduce the number of generations needed before seed is sold to farmers. This approach 
does not eliminate pest and disease threats with a zero-tolerance threshold, but it does potentially reduce 
such threats. It also requires considerable investment—both public and private—in traceability systems 
for seed, multiple or complementary seed quality categories, good seed production practices, and 
associated technologies. Importantly, the approach increases the space in which farmers, farmer 
organizations, and other actors can become producers of seed of greater quality than what they might 
otherwise produce using their own material. It is a pragmatic option that may dissatisfy some pathologists 
and regulators, but it recognizes the limitations of both formal and informal seed systems. What warrants 
further attention in this approach is the investment in traceability systems for seed, multiple seed quality 
categories, and good seed production practices. We explore each of these elements below. 
Traceability potentially allows for supply-chain actors—breeders, multipliers, distributors, 
transporters, retailers, and regulators—to track seed back to its source, isolate points along the supply 
chain where pest and disease threats might have emerged, and take remedial action to address these 
threats. Traceability systems may also allow for the monitoring of varietal adoption and quality seed 
use—an important but still elusive means of measuring the impact of public investment in agricultural 
research and extension (Wossen et al. 2019; Kosmowski et al. 2019; Floro et al. 2017; Bold et al. 2017; 
Maredia et al. 2016; Rabbi et al. 2015). Traceability systems range from simple paper-based tagging 
systems that designate origin, source, or permissible distribution areas, to more sophisticated tools such as 
NASC’s Cassava Seed Tracker or blockchain technologies. There are, however, potential limits on 
traceability when the purchase of planting material through formal channels (where traceability systems 
are installed) happens infrequently due to low replacement rates.  
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In addition, these traceability systems are only as good as the seed producers that manage them. 
And for many VPCs, those seed producers are likely to be farmers or farmer-based organizations serving 
their immediate localities, given the bulkiness and perishability of most VPC seed. Greater investment in 
developing the capacity of seed entrepreneurs and farmer-based organizations may be the most important 
investment that can be made to accelerate the growth of VPC seed markets serving the needs of 
smallholder farmers. These capacity needs include training in seed production, identification and 
management of pests and diseases, and proper storage and packaging of seed, as well as business skill and 
enterprise development. Such capacity development efforts may be complemented by targeted subsidy 
programs designed to lower the costs of production for these types of seed producers, improve the 
viability of commercial seed distribution networks, or encourage farmer uptake of quality seed. Note, 
however, that past experience with both producer and consumer (farmer) subsidy programs for seed 
system development has been ambiguous at best, with mixed records of success across both crops and 
countries. There are many examples of capacity development projects and subsidy programs in this vein, 
several of which have been described above. But their success ultimately relies on the signal associated 
with their products. And this is where multiple quality standards play an important role in providing 
information to farmers and creating trust and reputational integrity for these producers over the long term. 
Multiple standards imply a combination of internal quality assurance practices; branding, packaging, and 
labeling by the producer itself; and signals of external quality assurance such as quality-declared or 
quality-assured seed tags that indicate compliance with a more farmer-appropriate standard than certified 
seed standards. (See FAO [2010] for protocols and standards for quality-declared planting material for 
VPCs.) In several of the crop-country combinations covered in this study, the absence of multiple 
standards—indeed, the illegality of certain standards and practices—suggests significant opportunity for 
policy reform. 
Importantly, the introduction of multiple classes or categories reduces entry barriers to the VPC 
seed market and allows seed producers to pursue marketing strategies such as product differentiation and 
price discrimination. These factors, in turn, may encourage growth in the market for VPC seed and the 
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markets for specific niches, including specific farmer typologies, agroecologies, and product attributes. 
Necessarily, this outcome hinges on sufficient supply of early-generation seed, regulatory capacity to 
certify this seed, and investment in farmer entrepreneurs and farmer-based organizations.  
This strategy of introducing multiple seed categories—and thus encouraging the growth and 
expansion of VPC seed markets for smallholders—is partly built on the acceleration of varietal turnover. 
In many smallholder systems, demand for fresh seed will remain inextricably linked to demand for a new 
variety embodying new biotic and abiotic resistance traits, processing or consumption qualities, or other 
characteristics. Globally, varietal turnover is generally slow among clonal crops such as potato and 
cassava, and farmers may simply not be looking for new seed unless they are looking for new varieties 
with preferred traits. A continuous stream of new and improved varieties distributed as quality seed may 
be a more marketable product than simply quality seed of the same variety. But while this approach has 
merits, if the phytosanitary quality of VPC seed deteriorates faster than its genetic quality, then the 
acceleration of varietal turnover is unlikely to be a practical first-order strategy.15 Where low varietal 
turnover rates and unanticipated biotic stresses are common, a more viable strategy may be a combination 
of promoting quality seed management practices to farmers and supplying disease-free seed for periodic 
replacement. 
Given that the introduction of multiple seed categories is only as good as its implementation, our 
findings suggest a need for greater devolution and decentralization of regulatory processes to the local 
level. In effect, this means combining the internal quality assurance systems of the seed entrepreneur or 
farmer-based organization with both (1) an external oversight or audit function by the regulatory body, 
representing the supportive function (or credible threat) of external inspection of fields, plants, packaging, 
or records that limits rent-seeking behavior, and (2) technical support, training, and communication from 
those same bodies in building organizational capacity to meet regulatory expectations. Given the localized 
and dispersed nature of VPC seed markets, this requires some degree of decentralization of the public 
 
15 For an informative discussion of the role of seed systems in accelerating varietal turnover in roots, tubers, and bananas, 
see Thiele and colleagues (2021). 
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regulatory apparatus or accreditation of private or public local administrators mandated with oversight of 
agricultural development activities and programs.  
This strategy and its associated outcomes hinge on investment in better mechanisms to assess, 
revise, and communicate risk to farmers and other seed system actors. New and emerging pests and 
diseases are a constant threat to VPCs, and responses to those threats can be coordinated only through a 
well-integrated seed quality assurance system. The system described above attempts to provide such 
integration by professionalizing the seed system—in effect, formalizing the informal system while 
simultaneously informalizing the formal system.16 However, an integrated system also requires, inter alia, 
more effective procedures for identifying both local and transboundary threats in a timely manner; better 
risk assessment standards that are strictly based on science and not simply on zero-tolerance thresholds 
for every threat; greater capacity to conduct risk assessments, including assessments of social and 
economic risk; and better methods to communicate risk beyond technical experts—to farmers, farmer-
based organizations, consumers, and other seed system actors. 
We also note that there are potential gains to be made from engaging in regional and global 
agreements that seek to harmonize seed quality regulations and encourage trade in quality seed. This topic 
is already the focus of regional efforts among COMESA and ECOWAS member states, although progress 
has been mixed on revising domestic policy and regulation to bring them in line with the harmonization 
efforts. The gains from trade are potentially significant, ranging from new market opportunities for seed 
producers to greater competition in seed markets that lead to lower prices and more rapid technological 
innovation. For VPCs, however, the success of harmonization will depend acutely on whether multiple 
seed categories are introduced, whether traceability systems are put into place, and whether many of the 
other recommended options discussed above are addressed.  
Finally, these strategies are all contingent on continued public expenditure on breeding for host 
resistance to seedborne pathogens and the production and distribution of early-generation VPC seed. 
 
16 With thanks to Ahsan Rana (2010) for his first use of this analogy. 
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Ideally, these investments should be constants in VPC seed systems development.  
None of the policy and regulatory options presented here are immediate, short-term panaceas to 
the pervasive challenge of VPC seed system development. They require long-term investments in 
programs and projects that put smallholder farmers at the center of a change process while also 
challenging actor coalitions that have a stake in the status quo. But if the status quo is relevant to such a 
small share of the VPC seed system at present—as shown in the crop-country cases covered in this 




Efforts to build effective quality assurance systems for VPC seed are challenged by the fundamental 
nature of VPC seeds and seed markets in many developing countries. Binding constraints include not only 
biological characteristics such as perishability, bulkiness, low multiplication rates, and high rates of pest 
and disease accumulation, but also economic characteristics: market frictions such as highly localized, 
dispersed, and fragmented market structures and the nonappropriability of gains from innovation in these 
markets. To date, few developing countries have invested sufficient public resources in designing 
regulatory systems that are cognizant of these constraints and tailored to the characteristics of each crop 
and the context in which farmers cultivate these crops. These restrictions are illustrated by the four crop-
country combinations examined in this study.  
Our findings demonstrate that the status quo in terms of seed production, distribution, and 
regulation is untenable: state-led production systems and programs combined with strict, centralized 
regulatory regimes necessarily limit market size and reach, thereby limiting smallholder farmers’ access 
to both new genetics and quality seed. This status quo neither provides credible oversight or direction to 
VPC seed systems nor addresses the needs or preferences of farmers, whether or not they are well-
articulated through market or nonmarket mechanisms. Solutions require longer-term strategies that rely 
not only on technological fixes such as advanced propagation systems and seed tracking apps, but also on 
a policy and regulatory environment that explicitly encourages the coexistence of multiple seed quality 
categories and the integration of multiple seed production and marketing systems.  
We recommend a set of public policy, investment, and regulatory reforms that  
• recognize extant seed systems and end the marginalization or criminalization of informal 
seed production and trade;  
• prioritize public investment in early-generation seed production, distribution, and 
traceability systems;  
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• invest in capacity development for rural entrepreneurs and farmer-based organizations in 
VPC seed production and marketing;  
• introduce multiple or alternate seed quality categories such as quality-declared seed along 
with decentralization of quality assurance systems that combine internal systems with 
external oversight or the threat of such oversight; and  
• improve assessment and communication of risk associated with biotic and abiotic threats 
to VPCs that may be mitigated through the use of quality seed and improved genetics.  
Many of the elements in these policy, investment, and regulatory reforms are, in fact, observed in 
this study’s crop-country combinations or are common features of VPC seed systems in other countries 
with more mature seed markets. Yet in many developing countries, there remains a tension between 
specific actor coalitions with implicit interests in how one or more of these elements evolve. In other 
words, there are winners and losers in policy-change processes, and explicit recognition of the expected 
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